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ABSTRACT 
 
Under conditions of pervasive uncertainty, increasing the “amount” of information will not 
necessarily decrease uncertainty. Perhaps more information will even increase uncertainty. 
Since information may be valuable, even under conditions of pervasive uncertainty, this 
amounts to a puzzle. Its solution seems to hold the promise of understanding how decision-
makers actually go about reducing uncertainty in its more pervasive forms and is therefore at 
the center of attention in the present article. It is hypothesized that the role of routines in 
decision-making provides the key to solve the “information puzzle.” Drawing on data from 56 
companies, the argument is supported by empirical tests employing path analysis by linear 
structural equations modeling. 
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THE ROLE OF ROUTINES IN REDUCING PERVASIVE UNCERTAINTY 
 
Choice under uncertainty is one of the central problems in managerial and economic 
theories of choice. According to standard approaches in economics, the problem of choice 
under uncertainty may essentially be remedied by increasing the amount of information 
available to the decision-maker (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). A large class of choice problems 
however seems immune to this strategy, as casual observation, experimental economics 
(Kagel & Roth, 1995), various heterodox economists (Hodgson, 1988; Loasby, 1999) and the 
management literature point out (Weick, 1995). A common theme in these otherwise 
unrelated streams of literature is that there may be situations in which uncertainty prevails 
despite increases in information. We use the terms Knightean and pervasive uncertainty 
synonymously throughout the paper to denote such situations. As explained below, Knightean 
uncertainty is a situation in which it is impossible to associate point probabilities with events. 
From a theoretical perspective, the choice problems that are immune to solution by 
merely increasing the amount of information can be characterized by an absence of 
mathematical structure. This situation, whatever its cause, is often referred to as Knightean 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Runde, 1998). Under conditions of Knightean uncertainty, as 
opposed to risk, an increase in information is not likely to be helpful. As Weick suggests, 
more information may even increase uncertainty (Weick, 1995). If decision makers are seen 
to have limited cognitive resources (Simon, 1955), then the more attention decision-makers 
devote to solve impossible choice situations, the less will be available to take care of those 
problems that can be solved and uncertainty will increase. How then may decision-makers go 
about reducing pervasive uncertainty? Obviously, if information increases uncertainty, there 
should be less of it. This may not be a very good strategy however. After all, information may 
be valuable even under conditions of pervasive uncertainty. As we see it, this amounts to a 
puzzle, and a somewhat overlooked puzzle at that (one notable exception is Simon, 1947). 
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This is rather curious since its solution seems to hold the promise of understanding how 
decision-makers are capable of dealing with and/ or reducing uncertainty in its more pervasive 
forms. 
In what follows the “information puzzle” is at the center of attention, i.e., should 
information be increased or decreased in the face of pervasive uncertainty? As indicated by 
previous authors (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Richardson, 1960), considering “routines” 
may hold the key to solving the information puzzle. The present paper therefore aims to 
formulate and test a descriptive model that indicates how routines allow managers to 
successfully cope with pervasive uncertainty. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The ensuing section provides a brief review of the most 
widely used conceptualizations of uncertainty. Section three develops testable hypotheses, 
section four introduces data and measures and section five presents the results. The findings 
are discussed in section six followed by the conclusion. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
In order to consider the role of information in reducing uncertainty, this section briefly 
reviews the central conceptualizations of uncertainty in theories of choice. In economics, 
uncertainty arises when a decision can lead to more than one possible consequence (Radner, 
1994: 728). Uncertainty thus frustrates intentional choice. The standard conceptualization of 
uncertainty is usually based on Luce and Raiffa’s (1957) tripartite classification, which 
differentiates the realm of decision-making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty. Risk and 
uncertainty are distinguished by the nature of probabilities assigned to the different possible 
outcomes. The situation is typically envisioned in terms of a subset of alternatives, a 
corresponding set of consequences and an index function which reflects the decision-maker’s 
utility for the consequence associated with alternative X when nature is in state Y. The 
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decision-making problem, then, consists of choosing the subset of alternatives associated with 
optimal expected utility.  
In the realm of certainty there is no real problem since specific outcomes are secured 
per definition. In the realm of risk, the probabilities of outcomes are assumed known. The 
decision-maker can, therefore, proceed by computing the expected utility of the alternatives 
and choose those with the largest value. In the case of uncertainty the problem is more 
challenging. To be precise, the challenge in the case of uncertainty is to deduce the existence 
of a function whose expected value controls choice, a problem solved by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (Savage, 1954). Given the existence of such a function, the decision-maker can 
generate a subjective probability distribution for outcomes by using statistical information to 
update or generate an a priori distribution (Savage, 1954; Luce & Raiffa, 1957). Thus, 
objective probabilities are associated with risk whereas subjective probabilities are associated 
with uncertainty. In the realm of risk, all the possible consequences and the likelihood 
(probability) of each consequence are known, while in a situation of uncertainty, there is a set 
of possible specific outcomes, but the likelihood (or probability) of each outcome is initially 
unknown (Savage, 1954). The trick then is to use information to deduce a well-behaved index 
function, one whose expected values control choice.  
As opposed to this conceptualization of uncertainty, some authors argue that also a 
much stronger, pervasive form of uncertainty must be considered. In the words of March and 
Simon, “decision-making under uncertainty does not even allow complete knowledge of all 
possible outcomes and their associated probabilities and payoffs” (March & Simon, 1958: 
137). This notion of pervasive uncertainty goes back at least to Knight and Keynes. For 
Knight, a situation of risk is characterized by measurable uncertainty (a situation in which the 
probabilities of the outcomes are not known objectively, but can be estimated subjectively). 
Knight’s point is that this situation however “is so far different from an unmeasurable one 
that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all” (Knight, 1921: 20). This pervasive form of 
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uncertainty characterized by the impossibility of computing point probabilities has become 
known as “Knightean uncertainty.” Also for Keynes, uncertainty corresponded to an absence 
of measurable probabilistic knowledge: “About these matters there is no scientific basis on 
which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1973: 
114). 
The implications of this are as follows: First, let us acknowledge the existence of 
pervasive uncertainty in which the situation is so ill structured that the possible outcomes will 
remain unknown despite any attempt to remedy the situation. Let us, perhaps slightly 
incorrectly, refer to this as Knightean uncertainty. Note that our use of the term Knightean 
uncertainty is consistent with but broader than Knight’s (1921) original definition of 
uncertainty as one specific instance in which there is no support for an index function whose 
expected value controls choice (Runde, 1998). 
Second, situations characterized by Knightean uncertainty may call for different 
strategies than those situations, which, in some sense, may be remedied by increasing the 
amount of available information.  
Rational choice theory treats the problem of choice under uncertainty within the utility-
maximizing approach. By assumption, uncertainty may be reduced by sufficient statistical 
information. This translates into a general strategy of information seeking in which the basis 
for estimation of subjective probabilities and their accuracy will improve as the amount of 
available information increases. In the absence of Knightean uncertainty, the general strategy 
to improve choice under uncertainty is therefore to increase the amount of information. As 
explained in the ensuing section, introducing Knightean uncertainty may lead to the opposite 
conclusion. 
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HYPOTHESES 
In the following, we use our previous clarification of forms of uncertainty to develop 
hypotheses about the relation between intelligence dissemination, uncertainty and 
routinization. We argue that in an information extensive world (a world with an abundance of 
information), increasing intelligence dissemination will also increase uncertainty – see the 
section on “Intelligence dissemination and uncertainty,” below. The problem may be 
described as creating a viable basis for selective attention. Since routinization may create such 
a basis, we argue (in the section “Routinization and uncertainty”) that increasing routinization 
will reduce uncertainty. That is, routinization can be seen as a defense against the adverse 
effects of intelligence dissemination in an information extensive world. Therefore, we 
hypothesize (in the section “Intelligence dissemination and routinization”) that increasing 
intelligence dissemination will also increase routinization. In terms of derived effects, we 
argue (in the section “Routinization and responsiveness”) that increasing routinization will 
lead to an increase in responsiveness and (in “Detecting changes and responsiveness”) that 
increasing the speed of detecting changes, in turn, will increase responsiveness. According to 
our argument (in “Intelligence dissemination, uncertainty and the detection of changes”) the 
hypothesized first-order effect of intelligence dissemination is that it allows faster detection of 
changes. Intelligence dissemination may however, as a second-order effect, mediate the 
reduction of uncertainty through routinization. The conceptual model guiding the empirical 
test encompasses all these effects and is shown in Figure 1 below. The theoretical 
underpinning of this model is provided below.  
-------------------------- 
Figure 1 
-------------------------- 
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Intelligence dissemination and uncertainty 
The previous section defined three concepts associated with choice under uncertainty: 
“risk” (the possible outcomes and their probabilities are known), “uncertainty” (the possible 
outcomes are in principle known but their probabilities can only be subjectively estimated), 
and “Knightean uncertainty” (neither the possible outcomes nor their probabilities are 
known). Due to the difference between these forms of uncertainty, we believe that different 
strategies are appropriate to deal with their presence. As explained above, risk and uncertainty 
can be resolved by gathering more information.  
In the management literature, Knightean uncertainty is often described by its 
implications, typically in terms of some sort of ambiguity. According to this literature, 
ambiguity, and thus situations of Knightean uncertainty, cannot be resolved by gathering 
more information (Weick, 1995). The reason for this is that a situation characterized by 
Knightean uncertainty has too little structure for information to be helpful. As a basis for a 
realistic theory of choice, we further assume “bounded rationality,” according to which 
cognitive resources viewed in relation to a specific environment are limited (Simon, 1947, 
1955; March, 1978). It is this additional assumption which makes the strategy of increasing 
information in the face of Knightean uncertainty questionable. 
By definition, Knightean uncertainty implies that it is impossible to assign 
probabilities to outcomes. In theoretical terms this describes a situation where a unique 
mapping of alternative to outcomes cannot be defined. Therefore, to increase the amount of 
information will not have the slightest effect in reducing Knightean uncertainty. The 
underlying empirical reasons for such situations include confounding of multiple causes, 
interference of third variables, and the appearance of novel elements in the choice set.  
Increasing the amount of information will not decrease Knightean uncertainty, but 
neither can it be made worse. Due to the decision maker’s limited cognitive resources implied 
by our assumption of “bounded rationality,” there is a negative indirect effect. Allocating 
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scarce information processing resources to a problem that is impossible to solve because it is 
characterized by Knightean uncertainty, will further reduce the cognitive resources available 
to deal with other problems. And when there is less attention and information allocated to deal 
with problems that can be solved, the general state of uncertainty will increase. Therefore, if a 
decision maker faces multiple problems, an increase of information to solve one problem 
characterized by Knightean uncertainty may well increase the general state of uncertainty.   
Returning to our discussion of uncertainty, we distinguish between situations in which 
more information, in principle, is helpful (uncertainty and risk) and those situations in which 
increasing the amount of information is unhelpful (Knightean uncertainty). Adding the snag 
of information extensiveness, we believe that few real-life situations escape the conclusion 
that increasing the amount of information will increase uncertainty on part of a boundedly 
rational decision-maker. In all those situations characterized by Knightean uncertainty, more 
information will, by definition, not help and may well increase the general state of 
uncertainty. Therefore, we hypothesize that increasing information will lead to an increase in 
uncertainty in the presence of pervasive uncertainty and/ or information extensiveness.  
Hypothesis 1. In the presence of pervasive uncertainty and/ or information 
extensiveness, increasing intelligence dissemination leads to an increase in uncertainty. 
 
Routinization and uncertainty 
In the previous section, we have stated that the strategy most often applied in reducing 
uncertainty might not work under conditions of Knightean uncertainty. Does this mean there 
is an insurmountable problem for decision-makers? If not, how can decision-makers deal with 
the problem? The economics, institutional economics and organization theory literatures 
contain hints regarding a possible “strategy” for dealing with pervasive uncertainty (see e.g. 
Heiner, 1983; Perrow 1970; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). A very clear statement is Heiner’s 
(1983: 570) hypothesis that, “greater uncertainty will cause rule-governed behavior to exhibit 
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increasingly predictable regularities, so that uncertainty becomes the basic source of 
predictable behavior.” 
Although Heiner’s statement implies a causal direction that runs counter to what is 
required for a strategy, it is a strong basis for hypothesizing a connection between 
routinization and reducing uncertainty. It is not the only such basis, though. Arguments can be 
found which turn the direction of causality so increases in routinization may be viewed as an 
uncertainty decreasing strategy (see e.g. Hodgson, 1988; Richardson, 1960; Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999). Thus, firms may (1) increase predictability by fixing certain parameters, and 
they may, at the same time, (2) free limited cognitive resources. Institutions and routines not 
only work as constraints but also, as emphasized by Hodgson (1988), are sources of regular 
and predictable behavior in the face of uncertainty, complexity and information overload. 
North (1990) provides a similar statement. According to North (1990), uncertainty stems from 
the agents’ computational limitations and the complexity of the environment. In consequence 
of these cognitive limitations, in conjunction with the uncertainties involved in deciphering 
the environment, North (1990, 25) argues, “rules and procedures evolve to simplify the 
process.” Thus predictability may increase due to the presence of institutions, which exist 
prior to the firm’s entry in a particular society or industry. Firms may also choose to introduce 
routines to the same effect.  
The classical statement of this strategy is Knight’s (1921) suggestion that firms may 
prefer relatively predictable lines of activity to more speculative operations. Later, Knight & 
Merriam (1948) suggested that predictability increases in the tendency to follow routines. 
Richardson’s (1960) suggestion that “restraints” introduce the necessary friction for the 
working of the economic system further elaborates on this issue. Whatever the source of such 
“restraints,” Richardson (1960, 69) suggests they serve to “…increase the supply of market 
information by reducing the freedom of action of individual units in the system.” Since the 
strength of these “restraints” may, within limits, be viewed as endogenous variables, 
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Richardson (1960) opens the possibility that routinization, too, may be viewed as an 
uncertainty decreasing strategy.  
More recently, the managerial literature has emphasized that routinization reduces 
systems level uncertainty associated with competition and technological risk (Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999). The firm may, for example, choose to routinize their operations in order to 
deliver standardized products that may increase the acceptance of new technologies (Ibid.). 
Apart from introducing predictability at the systems level, a number of authors (e.g. Simon, 
1947) have emphasized that routines also greatly reduce the individual level cognitive 
demands. Routines allow managers to cope with uncertainty under the constraint of bounded 
rationality because they can be used to save on mental efforts and thus preserve scarce 
capacity required to deal with non-routine events (Egidi & Ricottilli, 1997). For the two 
reasons provided here (routines introduce predictability by fixing certain parameters and 
routines free cognitive resources), we hypothesize the following relationship between 
routinization and uncertainty: 
Hypothesis 2. Increasing routinization will decrease uncertainty. 
 
Intelligence dissemination and routinization 
We have argued that in an information extensive world, intelligence dissemination leads 
to an increase in uncertainty and, at the same time, that routinization may decrease 
uncertainty. What, however, does this mean for the relation between intelligence 
dissemination and routinization? 
From the assumption of bounded rationality and limited cognitive resources (Simon, 
1955), it follows that there will be a threshold of information extensiveness surpassing the 
limit of the actor’s cognitive resources. There will be a point at which her cognitive resources 
will be overburdened and countermeasures will have to be used in order to cope with the 
situation. Moreover, in the case of an ill-structured environment, it may simply be impossible 
 12 
to derive a function that can support the ordering of outcomes. In both instances, a 
countermeasure has to be designed, which will simplify and/ or structure the decision problem 
so it can be handled within the cognitive limitations of the individual decision-maker.  
As the previous section indicates, routinization provides one general form of the 
solution to this problem. Routines greatly reduce the cognitive demands on individuals and 
thus preserve scarce information-processing and decision-making capacity (Egidi & Ricottilli, 
1997). When the organization increases its level of intelligence dissemination (information 
flow), it is, therefore, suggested that the organization must increasingly rely on routinized 
procedures.  
Note that routinization is not the only strategy to deal with increased intelligence 
dissemination. Specialization is a further general strategy that may be used to handle 
increasing levels of intelligence dissemination. Thus, a business organization may channel 
different types of information to different departments, and so on. It is important to recognize 
that such specialization in intelligence dissemination must necessarily rely on some sorting 
procedure. Again, in the case of information extensiveness, this sorting procedure must itself 
be based on a routinized treatment of the channeling of information. Although increased 
specialization may well be used as a countermeasure to handle increases in the level of 
intelligence dissemination, this solution will always go hand in hand with increased 
routinization. According to a classic argument, specialization has the further possible 
detrimental effect that it leads to an increase in the need for coordination, a problem that may 
be countered by increased routinization (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Loasby, 1999). Due to the 
direct effect, that routines greatly reduce the cognitive demands on individuals, and because 
of the indirect effect associated with specialization, we suggest:  
 Hypothesis 3. Increasing intelligence dissemination leads to an increase in 
routinization. 
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Routinization and responsiveness 
By now, we have argued that in an information extensive world, intelligence 
dissemination entails two effects: on the one hand an increase in uncertainty and on the other 
an increase in routinization that, in turn, may reduce uncertainty. This leads to an unclear 
outcome that must be treated as an empirical question. There is a further question, however, 
regarding the firm’s responsiveness, defined as the ability to react to changes (Guiso, 1998). 
Will increased routinization lead to a more lethargic response or increased responsiveness?  
As indicated above, routines increase the potential for focused attention (Simon 1947; 
Postrel & Rumelt 1992; Walsh & Ungson, 1991) by preserving scarce information-processing 
and decision-making capacity (Ashmos, Duchon & McDaniel, 1998). Attention is usually 
focused on non-routine events whereas recurring events are dealt with semi-consciously 
(Cohen, 1991: 135; Postrel & Rumelt 1992; Simon, 1947: 99). Since the semi-conscious 
processing of repetitive events requires less or almost no cognitive resources, this procedure, 
when established, leads to an increase in the available cognitive potential that may be used to 
attend to non-routine events. More precisely, after some periods of learning in which attention 
is directed at some activity, there is a tendency for habituation and smooth semi-conscious 
execution to substitute for attention (Reason, 1990).  
In the case of change, events are always novel in some sense, and thus require non-
routine response. As aforementioned, responsiveness can be defined as the ability to react to 
changes. Since routinization, according to the above argument, increases the potential for 
focused attention, responsiveness should increase in routinization. Put differently, 
routinization introduces a division of labor where trivial frequently occurring events, such as 
straight rebuy in Webster & Wind’s influential classification of industrial buyer behavior, are 
handled with very limited resources. The resources, which would otherwise be employed in 
the absence of routinized behavior, are then free to respond to novel and changing events.  
Hypothesis 4. Increasing routinization leads to an increase in responsiveness. 
 14 
Detecting changes and responsiveness 
In the previous section, we argued that routinization would increase the firm’s 
responsiveness. According to a literature survey of the strategy literature as well as related 
literatures, it appears that the notion of responsiveness consists mainly of three aspects (ABI 
Inform database 1996 to 1999): (1) reacting to changes, which can be broken down into the 
willingness and the readiness to do so (Guiso 1998), (2) reaction speed (Zaheer & Zaheer, 
1997), e.g. in the form of average production lead time and average work-in-process-
inventory, or cycle time, and (3) responsiveness to local signals, as opposed to global 
integration (Taggart, 1997). Because reacting to changes and reaction speed are directly 
related to the speed of detecting changes, there should be a positive correlation between 
detecting changes and responsiveness. This hypothesis builds on the assumption that the firm 
has the necessary free resources available to respond to change once it is detected. That is, we 
expect that intelligence dissemination will increase routinization (Hypothesis 3) and that 
routinization, in turn, will increase (the potential for) responsiveness (Hypothesis 4). Thus, 
given Hypotheses 3 and 4, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5. Increasing the speed of detecting changes increases responsiveness. 
 
Intelligence dissemination, uncertainty and the detection of changes 
In a very straightforward manner, information is a necessary prerequisite for detecting 
changes. Without information, one cannot get an impression of the state of the world, which 
then can be compared against the state of the world at a later point in time. In consequence, 
the correlation between intelligence dissemination and the detection of changes should be 
positive. 
Hypothesis 6. Increasing intelligence dissemination leads to faster detection of changes. 
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Finally, we believe that increasing uncertainty will decrease the firm’s responsiveness. 
When uncertainty increases, workers and managers will be occupied with reducing 
uncertainty or simply be in a state of confusion where nobody knows what to do. Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7. Increasing uncertainty leads to a decrease in responsiveness. 
 
In testing the above hypotheses, it must be noted that considering the role of culture in 
causing uncertainty and routinization is outside the scope of the present article and therefore a 
question for further research. As has been pointed out, the response of individual decision-
makers to uncertainty and other strategic issues is also influenced by national culture, as well 
as other factors (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991). This raises the point that there are different 
causes for uncertainty, and that additional strategies of responding to uncertainty (apart from 
routinization) might be thought of. However, we have defined the concepts of uncertainty and 
routinization in general terms independent of their specific underlying causes (including 
particular cultural influences). Also the constructs we use to capture aspects of information 
processing (intelligence dissemination and detecting change) have proven reliable across 
cultural settings (Jaworski and Kohli, 1996). We therefore expect that future research on the 
influences of culture on uncertainty and routinization will add important detail to our findings 
but not reject their general validity. 
 
METHODS 
Data and Measures 
Data. The empirical test uses data from a survey on selected Danish industries 
conducted in 1999. The industries were chosen according to the criterion that they should 
experience different levels of uncertainty and all be subject to problems of information 
extensiveness. Since these characteristics are often associated with issues related to the natural 
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environment in terms of conflicting demands from various different stakeholders (reducing 
environmental impact according to industry-, local-, regional-, national- and international 
standards etc.), we chose six industries with these characteristics. The selected industries were 
the chemical-, medical-, paint-, electronics-, textile- and dairy-industry. In operational terms, 
the industries were identified on the basis of the firm’s NACE code for 1999 as registered in 
the publicly available database CD-Direct. A limit of employees >10 was used as cut-off 
point. 
Using these criteria resulted in a sampling frame of 1007 firms with more than ten 
employees. An initial contact procedure was applied in order to increase the response rate and 
to record information that allowed a screening of firms not belonging to the sampling frame 
according to the above definition of the target population. According to the initial screening 
procedure (telephone interview), the sampling frame was adjusted to 908 firms. Out of these, 
545 firms accepted to participate in the survey and were mailed a self-administered 
questionnaire to be returned by surface mail. Non-respondents were subsequently contacted 
by telephone in order to inspire response or, alternatively, elucidate a reason for non-response. 
The 545 firms accepting participation were divided into two groups: group 1 comprising 146 
large or medium-sized firms with 50 or more employees, and, group 2 comprising 399 small 
firms with less than 50 employees. 
The large or medium-sized firms were mailed two questionnaires: (1) a questionnaire 
(referred to as type A) directed to the firm’s CEO, asking for detailed information at the 
strategic level, and (2) a questionnaire (referred to as type B) directed to the firm’s 
environmental manager (or the person with equivalent responsibility), asking for detailed 
information regarding the firm’s environmental practices. The small firms were only mailed 
one questionnaire (referred to as type C), directed to the firm’s CEO, comprising a reduced 
form of the combination of questionnaires A and B.  
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A total of 280 out of 908 firms returned at least one completed questionnaire to yield an 
overall response rate of 30.8% (27.0% if we adjust for the influence of 2 questionnaires on the 
response rate). In view of the rather large material, which had to be completed, and the 
relatively modest interest in the content of the survey on part of at least some firms in the 
sample frame, this result seems reasonable.  
Measures. Multiple-item composite scales measured all the constructs in order to 
increase reliability. Three types of scales were used in the survey. If possible, existing scales, 
which had a proven good track record in terms of reliability, were used. Thus Kohli, Jaworski 
& Kumar’s (1993) scale was used to measure the three constructs, intelligence dissemination, 
detecting change and responsiveness. It should be noted here that “detecting change” is a 
scale, which uses a subset of two items of Kohli et al.’s (1993) construct “intelligence 
generation.” The two items measure the speed in discovery of demand-side and industry-wide 
changes. The constructs “intelligence dissemination” and “responsiveness” were adopted in 
unaltered form from Kohli et al. The reason the two items comprising the scale “detecting 
change” were used is that Kohli et al.’s original construct “intelligence generation” was not 
reliable. By contrast, as can be seen in Table 1, below, the other two constructs, as well as the 
modified construct “detecting change,” had values of Cronbach’s Alpha between 0.81 and 
0.87, which must be considered satisfactory. 
-------------------------- 
Table 1 
-------------------------- 
In the case of uncertainty (related to environmental issues), we adopted a two-item scale 
developed by one of the authors in a previous study and, on the basis of literature studies, 
added three possible items. The computed value of 0.73 for Cronbach’s Alpha indicates a 
sufficient degree of scale-reliability. In fact, since the two-item scale from which it was 
developed had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.60, this represents significant improvement. 
 18 
The routines-scale was developed anew on the basis of theoretical considerations. The 
five selected items capture routinization as frequent social interaction (use of task groups), 
frequent use of fixed goals (for cost control) and frequent comparative cost analysis. The 
computed value of 0.74 for Cronbach’s Alpha indicates a sufficiently high scale-reliability 
and thus suggests that this scale is a useful basis from which a routinization scale can be 
further developed. 
We further employed a series of principal components analyses in order to test for 
unidimensionality. Since only one component had an eigenvalue above one, the scales are 
sufficiently unidimensional. We then assessed discriminant validity by testing the hypotheses 
that the correlation coefficients for any of the possible pairwise combinations of all five 
constructs did not deviate from unity. Since this hypothesis was rejected in all ten tests, we 
obtained sufficient discriminant validity. 
Since new employees are likely to cause a temporary increase in routinization and 
uncertainty and perhaps have less ability to detect important changes, we included a control 
measuring the number of new managers hired. For comparable reasons, we also controlled for 
the number of “old” managers leaving. The effect of managers leaving can be positive if they 
are low performers or in any other way pose a problem. It can however also be negative if the 
organization looses valuable competence. Even if the effect of old managers leaving is not 
entirely clear, it is important to control for.  
 
Empirical Test of the Hypothesized Model 
We use structural equation modeling employing a series of nested models as suggested 
by Anderson & Gerbing (1988). As shown in Table 2 below, six models were estimated: (1) 
the independence model (null structural model), (2), the next most likely constrained model, 
(3) the most likely constrained model, (4) the target model excluding controls (5) the most 
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likely unconstrained model including controls, (6) the next most likely unconstrained model 
including controls.  
We employ sequential chi-square difference tests under the null hypothesis of no 
significant difference between two nested structural models (see Steiger, Shapiro & Browne, 
1985). In addition to assessment of overall model fit by sequential chi-square difference tests, 
we used three incremental fit indices, Bentler’s (1990) comparative fit index (CFI), the 
Tucker & Lewis (1973) index (TLI) and Bollen’s (1986) relative fit index. These three indices 
were employed since they are all corrected for degrees of freedom, an important requirement 
for the test of nested models. The CFI has been suggested as the most promising relative fit 
index (in the sense that it overcomes sample size dependence) but neglects the relative 
parsimony of alternative models. We, therefore supplement by the TLI, which puts a premium 
on parsimony. 
------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------- 
We used maximum likelihood estimation and subsequently evaluated the fit of the 
models. Table 2 presents a summary of the results. To identify model 1 and 1*, we fixed the 
weights of seven error terms to unity. The difference between model 1 and model 1* is that 
the latter assumes identical variance over the three constructs: intelligence dissemination, 
uncertainty and detection of change. As the model comparison in Table 3 below shows, there 
is no significant difference in fit between the more parsimonious model 1* and model 1. 
Neither do we see great differences in the fit indices. Both models provide excellent fit. 
Comparing model 1* and 2* shows that the controls, “new mangers hired” and “old 
managers leaving” play a significant role in explaining routinization and detection of change. 
When looking at the effects of these control variables, it is comforting that they are positive 
and significantly correlated. That is, new managers tend to be hired as old ones are leaving. 
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Moreover, when new managers are hired, uncertainty increases, routinization decreases and 
detection of change decreases. All effects seem intuitively plausible. That old managers 
leaving has the exactly opposite effect, is interesting since it may be viewed as the positive 
effect of getting rid of a problematic situation. Thus, uncertainty decreases, routinization 
increases and detection of change increases as old managers leave. Note, however, that only 
the routinization effect of old managers leaving is significant (at p=0.05).  
------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------- 
We next turn to the target model (2*) and the test of hypotheses. First note that the fit 
indices in Table 2 shows an excellent fit for model 2*. Then note that the model comparison 
shown in Table 3 below does not show any significant difference in fit between our target 
model 2* and model 1*. Both models fit the data equally well.  
Further note that there is no support for Hypothesis 7. Although the sign is as 
hypothesized, the effect is not significant. Strictly speaking, neither can Hypothesis 1 be 
supported at P=0.05. At P=0.10, however, the effect is significant and the positive sign 
supports Hypothesis 1. Finally, all the remaining effects are significant and have the expected 
sign. That is, our results support Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5, and Hypothesis 6 whereas Hypotheses 
1 and 7 are rejected. 
According to Kohli et al. (1993), the two constructs “intelligence dissemination” and 
“responsiveness” should be positively correlated. As can be seen from Table 3, this is indeed 
the case. As an additional piece of information, it should be noted that the path that controls 
for the possible influence of “detecting change” on “routinization” is not significant. 
Moreover, we included a covariance term to control for the interaction between “detecting 
change” and “uncertainty.” As can be seen from the correlation shown in Table 3, there is a 
significant negative interaction between these two constructs. 
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Next, we examined the more parsimonious models 3* and 4*. As Table 3 shows, it 
cannot be rejected that they fit the data equally well as models 1 and 1*. What happens 
though is that the explanatory power decreases dramatically and the fit indices for model 4* 
are clearly poorer than those estimated for the previous models. Since the estimated effects 
however remain remarkably stable across the five models, we may invest some confidence in 
the validity of the results. 
 
RESULTS 
We believe that the most important result is that Hypothesis 2, Heiner’s hypothesis, was 
supported: increasing routinization will decrease uncertainty. To our knowledge, this is the 
first time Heiner’s hypothesis has been put to an empirical test, and as indicated in the 
conclusion, this empirical finding may have significant theoretical implications. 
Also Hypothesis 3 was supported: increasing intelligence dissemination leads to an 
increase in routinization. This indicates that routinization may help free up cognitive 
resources and therefore serve as a viable strategy to overcome problems associated with 
cognitive limitations. The hypothesis that increasing routinization not only frees up limited 
cognitive resources, but also does this in a way that responsiveness is increased (Hypothesis 
4) was supported. We believe a plausible explanation for this finding is that frequently 
occurring events are dealt with semi-consciously, while cognitive resources (attention for 
example) are responding to novel and changing events. Hypothesis 5, that increasing the 
speed of detecting changes increases responsiveness, was supported as well. This is consistent 
with the support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. Finally, there was support for Hypothesis 6, that 
increasing intelligence dissemination leads to faster detection of changes, which also adds 
consistency to our system of hypotheses: without information, it is impossible to compare the 
old and the new, and thus impossible to detect changes.  
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While Hypothesis 2-6 were supported, Hypotheses 1 and 7 were rejected. Even though 
the estimate has the right sign, and is significant at p=0.10, Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. So, 
increasing intelligence dissemination in an information extensive world does not necessarily 
increase uncertainty. It seems important to better understand the reason for this result. One 
possibility is simply that our measures were too coarse. In addition, “information 
extensiveness” was an alleged attribute of the environment of the firms included in our 
survey. A future study may consider an alternative research design in which an explicit 
measure of “information extensiveness” is included. A second and altogether different reason 
for the rejection of Hypothesis 1 may be that information will only influence uncertainty if the 
received information entails a binding commitment to act. Otherwise, the information may 
simply be ignored. The second rejected hypothesis was Hypothesis 7. Although showing the 
right sign, the effect is not significant. So we cannot conclude that increasing uncertainty 
leads to a decrease in responsiveness. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The present article has proposed and tested a descriptive model that indicates how 
routines allow managers to successfully cope with pervasive uncertainty. The results have a 
number of implications: 
First, our empirical results are consistent with the theoretical argument, that routines 
help managers cope with Knightean uncertainty. If this is true, it is problematic to assume that 
Knightean uncertainty can always be reduced to risk as suggested by standard approaches to 
the theory of choice. From a theoretical viewpoint, this reduction of Knightean uncertainty 
will cause an unfortunate blind spot. The empirical results suggest that it is important to 
distinguish between pervasive, “Knightean” uncertainty and weaker forms of uncertainty. The 
implication for theory is the need to conceptually distinguish between the two forms of 
uncertainty. As has been shown, confounding the two types of uncertainty and choosing to 
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increase the information available in both cases might decrease performance in managerial 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
Second, the empirical results support what Simon as well as Cyert & March (1963) have 
long stated: limited attention plays a crucial role in deciding the feasibility of decision- and 
problem-solving strategies. When attention is the scarce resource, strategies that do not 
require much of it are at a premium. Interestingly, although the message has been around 
since the 1950’s, it is now gaining new momentum due to the rapid and massive changes in 
the economy caused by the Internet. In the wake of this, one of the leading books on the 
Network Economy talks about the “Economics of Attention” (Shapiro & Varian 1999: 6) – a 
resurrection of March and Olsen’s (1976: 22) call for a “Theory of Organizational Attention.” 
The arguments of the present paper – supported by the empirical analysis –is a further reason 
to set the inquiry into mechanisms of allocation of individual and organizational attention 
high on the research agenda.  
Third, the results are consistent with the idea that managers seek to cope with problems 
of limited attention by strategies that free cognitive resources. Fixing the recurring and 
relatively unimportant parameters in a decision problem by habitualization and routinization 
seems to be amongst the more common of such strategies. Although our empirical analyses 
are limited in scope, we believe that there is a whole range of semi-conscious mechanisms 
dealing with recurring problems so attention can be freed to focus on novel problems. Even 
though such mechanisms have been studied in the theory of human error (Reason, 1990), they 
tend to be ignored in both economic and managerial theories of choice. We believe that 
identification of these semi-conscious mechanisms, and to understand the interaction between 
a semi-automatic mode of operation and a knowledge-based mode of operation deserve much 
more attention in economic and managerial theories of choice. The terms ‘habit’ and 
‘routines’ might be a good starting point for exploring this avenue. 
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Fourth, the strong support for Hypothesis 2 as well as the consistency of this result with 
the support for Hypotheses 3-6 imply that habitualization and routinization must be viewed as 
general uncertainty decreasing strategies. Habits and routines are fundamental and commonly 
used mechanisms for dealing with choice in the face of pervasive uncertainty. Not only is the 
theoretical importance of pervasive uncertainty increasingly acknowledged, also a wealth of 
management texts indicate that various sources of pervasive uncertainty are becoming more 
and more virulent in recent times. For these reasons, re-directing attention to routinization as a 
key strategy in coping with pervasive uncertainty should be high on the agenda of economic 
and managerial theories of choice. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptives and coefficient Alpha for scales 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
      
Intelligence disseminationa, 5 items, Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.87 
interdepartmental meetings 56 5.20 1.95 -1.04 -0.15 
spend time discussing 
between departments 
56 5.36 1.69 -1.22 0.77 
everyone informed in short 
time 
56 5.39 1.56 -0.96 0.29 
regular dissemination 56 4.23 1.82 -0.11 -1.16 
fast to notice others 61 5.49 1.83 -0.21 0.08 
Scale 56 5.07 1.33   
      
Routinizationc, 5 items. Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.74 
frequency of use of task 
groups in preparing strategic 
decisions 
56 5.02 1.55 -1.11 0.92 
frequency of use of task 
groups in development 
schemes 
56 5.88 1.34 -1.52 2.52 
frequency of use of fixed 
goals for controlling costs 
56 6.16 0.93 -1.04 1.01 
frequency of use of fixed 
goals for production costs 
56 5.61 1.51 -1.17 0.88 
frequency of comparative 
analysis of production cost 
variations with regard to 
goals 
56 5.86 1.45 -1.80 3.06 
Scale 56 5.70 0.96   
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TABLE 1, ctd. 
Descriptives and coefficient Alpha for scales 
      
Uncertaintyb. 5 items. Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.73 
Don’t react because 
uncertainty is so great:  
56 2.70 1.74 1.01 0.55 
Uncertainty regarding how to 
include environmental 
regards into management:  
56 2.45 1.52 0.98 0.30 
Uncertainty related to costs 
induced 
56 4.27 1.95 -0.04 -1.10 
Uncertainty as to how to 
consider demands from 
authorities 
56 3.64 1.83 0.48 -0.57 
Uncertainty as to how to 
consider demands from other 
externals 
56 3.30 1.65 0.55 0.07 
Scale 56 3.27 1.21   
      
Detecting changea. 2 items. Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.87 
Fast to discover changes in 
customer preferences 
61 5.66 1.63 -0.06 0.26 
Fast to discover fundamental 
changes in our trade 
61 5.98 1.60 -0.56 0.89 
Scale 61 5.54 1.23   
      
Responsivenessa. 9 items. Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.81 
Quick decision on reaction to 
price changes 
61 5.67 1.86 -0.51 0.30 
Tendency to perceive 
changes in customer needs 
61 5.57 1.66 0.08 0.26 
Periodic review of product 
development 
56 5.68 1.32 -1.87 4.77 
Regular interdepartmental 
meetings on reactions to 
external changes 
56 4.98 1.69 -0.67 0.00 
Immediate implementation of 
response to competitor 
campaigns 
56 5.89 1.22 -1.11 1.01 
Inter-departmental activities 
well-coordinated 
56 5.14 1.24 -0.81 1.04 
Customer complaints are 
perceived 
61 6.43 1.56 -1.56 3.96 
Manage to implement plans 
in time 
61 5.46 2.04 -0.43 -0.31 
Involved departments 
coordinate product changes 
56 5.77 0.97 -0.62 0.05 
Scale 56 5.49 0.90   
      
Controls      
Old managers leaving 56 1.68 1.65 1.41 1.87 
New managers hired 56 2.27 2.12 1.44 2.56 
Value for deviation from normality (exact significance. K-S test) >0.05, except for "detection of change."  
aScale adopted from Kohli et al. (1993) 
bScale refined from prior study conducted by one of the authors 
cNewly developed scale 
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TABLE 2 
Model estimation and goodness of fit statistics 
 
 Model 1 Model 1* Model 2* Model 3* Model 4* 
Path Std. 
Coeff. 
P Std. 
Coeff. 
P Std. 
Coeff. 
P Std. 
Coeff. 
P Std. 
Coeff. 
P 
Intelligence dissemination ---> Routinization 0.21 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 
Intelligence dissemination ---> Uncertainty 0.17 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 
Intelligence dissemination ---> Detecting change 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.05 --- --- --- --- 
Routinization ---> Uncertainty -0.19 0.04 -0.17 0.05 -0.19 0.04 -0.20 0.03 -0.20 0.03 
Routinization ---> Responsiveness 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.04 --- --- 
Detecting change ---> Routinization 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.06 0.16 --- --- --- --- 
Detecting change ---> Responsiveness 0.25 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.26 0.00 --- --- --- --- 
Uncertainty ---> Responsiveness -0.05 0.15 -0.05 0.15 -0.05 0.15 -0.11 0.07 --- --- 
 
Controls           
New managers hired ---> Uncertainty 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.05 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
New managers hired ---> Routinization -0.22 0.05 -0.22 0.05 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
New managers hired ---> Detecting change -0.35 0.01 -0.34 0.01 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Old managers leaving ---> Uncertainty -0.12 0.12 -0.11 0.13 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Old managers leaving ---> Routinization 0.30 0.02 0.31 0.02 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Old managers leaving ---> Detecting change 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.07 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
           
Correlations           
Intelligence dissemination <---> Responsiveness 0.71 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.69 0.00 --- --- 
Detecting change <---> Uncertainty -0.17 0.05 -0.27 0.04 -0.34 0.02 --- --- --- --- 
New managers hired <---> Old managers leaving 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.00 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
           
Goodness-of-Fit           
D.f. 4 0.93 6 0.89 2 0.62 1 0.35 1 0.35 
Chisq 0.89  2.31  0.96  0.89  0.89  
Cmin/d.f. 0.22  0.39  0.48  0.89  0.89  
NFI. IFI. TLI. CFI 0.99  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.85  
RMSEA 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    
           
Squared multiple correlations           
Routinization 0.10  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.04  
Uncertainty 0.09  0.08  0.06  0.05  0.05  
Detection of change 0.11  0.10  0.03  ---  ---  
Responsiveness 0.19  0.19  0.19  0.06  ---  
2-Tailed probabilities. 
aModel 1*, 2*, 3*, 4*: variance of intelligence disemination. uncertainty and detection of change constrained to identical values. 
bAll Hoelter 0.05 >200, but RFI< 0.90 for model 3* and 4*. 
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TABLE 3 
Model comparisons and incremental fit 
Model  df Chi-Square Probability 
Model 1 4 0.89 0.93 
Model 1* 6 2.31 0.89 
Null model 1* 21 98.31 0.00 
Model 2* 2 0.96 0.62 
Null model 2* 10 60.27 0.00 
Model 3* 1 0.89 0.35 
Null model 3* 6 48.52 0.00 
Model 4* 1 0.89 0.35 
Null model 4* 3 5.97 0.11 
    
Model comparison    
Model 1* against model 1 2 1.42 0.49 
Model 2* against model 1* 4 1.36 0.85 
Model 3* against model 1* 5 1.42 0.92 
Model 4* against model 1* 5 1.42 0.92 
    
Model 1* against null model 1* 15 96.00 0.00 
Model 2* against null model 2* 8 59.31 0.00 
Model 3* against null model 3* 5 47.63 0.00 
Model 4* against null model 4* 2 5.08 0.08 
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FIGURE 1 
Conceptual model of proposed relations among constructs 
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